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-YS.-
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ARGUMENrr 
Point 1. rrHE OPINION OF rriiE COURT AND THE 
AFFIRl\lANCJ1J OF THE JUDG11ENT, ARE PREDI-
(1ATED ON SUBSr:rANTIAL MISSTATEMENTS 
AND 0:\IISSIONS OF :MA'l,ERIAL UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE. 
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Appellant refers to a portion of the last paragraph 
on page 2 of the opinion, which is as follows: 
"lt must also be noted that in the matters re-
ferred to, plaintiff relies chiefly upon alleged 
promises and representations of the architect, and 
upon the contention that the architect was agent 
for the defendants. An architect is not ordinarily 
a general agent for his employer (3 Am. Jur. 
1000) and in this instance it was expressly so 
provided in the contract documents. Clearly he 
did not have authority to bind Parry on a promise 
of construction of another structure.'' 
Appellant states: 
''The statement is not only an unfair state-
ment of the contention of appellant, but it contra-
dicts the findings submitted by respondents and 
adopted by the trial court.'' 
rrhe above quotation from the opinion, clearly states 
that the architect was not a general agent of the defend-
ants Parry. This position is substantiated by the fol-
lowing taken from plaintiff's Exhibit P-3, which is the 
general conditions of the contract: 
• '~1rt. 15. Changes in the Work.-The Owner, 
without invalidating the Contract, may order 
extra work or make changes by altering, adding 
to or deducting from the work, the Contract Sum 
being adjusted accordingly. All such work shall 
be executed under the conditions of the original 
contract except that any claim for extension of 
time caused thereby shall be adjusted at the time 
of ordering such change.'' 
"In giving instructions, the Architect shall 
have authority to make minor changes in the 
J 
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work, not involving extra cost, and not inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the building, but other-
wise, except in an emergency endangering life or 
property, no extra work or change shall be made 
unless in pursuance of a written order from the 
Owner signed or countersigned by the Architect, 
or a written order from the Architect stating that 
the Owner has authorized the extra work or 
change, and no claim for an addition to the con-
tract sum shall be valid unless so ordered.'' 
"Art. 38. Architect's Status.-rrhe Architect shall 
haYe general supervision and direction of the 
work. He is the agent of the Owner only to the 
extent provided in the Contract Documents and 
when in special instances he is authorized by the 
Owner so to act, and in such instances he shall 
upon request, show the Contractor written au-
thority.'' 
These contract provisions clearly show that the 
architect was an agent of the defendants Parry, and not 
a general agent to the extent of making representations 
to the contractor for additional construction, which 
would ha\·e to be within the scope of the architect agenc:•.r 
to be binding upon the defendants Parry. 
There has never been any denial that under the 
terms of the contract documents that the architect was 
the limited agent in accordance with the contract docu-
ments of the defendants Parry . 
.. A.t the bottom of page 6, appellant makes this state-
ment: 
"While the architect was the agent of the 
owners, his representations and instructions to 
Mr. :Millard as to 'dwt should be included in the 
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bid was what was to be excluded, were the repre-
~wntations and instructions of the owners.'' 
ln answer to the above statement it should be :firstly 
contended, that defendants Parry would be responsible 
for the statements of the architect, only within the scope 
of his authority, and they were limited by the contract 
documents as aforestated. Secondly, the plaintiff had 
in his possession the plans and specifications which were 
1 he basis of his bid to be made, and there is no variance 
behveen any of the sets of plans and specifications of 
the plaintiff, defendants, or the set :filed with the City 
for the permit to build. 
On Page 7, appellant makes the following statement: 
'' rrhe architect procured a bid on plumbing 
and told Mr. 1Iillard to base his bid on that :figure. 
He also told Mr. :Jiillard to exclude sewer as that 
was to be covered by another construction project. 
It is undisputed that the contract documents re-
serve to the owner the right to let other contracts, 
(Exhibit P-3)." 
Included within the specifications were the follow-
ing statements concerning connection of the sewer and 
water in the building to the city mains. Under the gen-
eral heading of plumbing in the specifications at page 34, 
under the heading "Utilities" it is provided: 
''Provide and install a 1 lh" diameter water 
service with all necessary fittings as shown on the 
plot plan. 
''Provide all necessary material and labor for 
the installation of a 4" diameter soil pipe sewer 
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from the building and connecting to the city sewer 
as shown on the plot plan.'' 
Under the heading ''Waste and Vent System'' at 
page 35 of the specifications, it provides as follows: 
·'Provide a complete system of waste and vent 
piping as necessary and connect to sewer system." 
The specifications, including the above quotations, 
including the water and sewer system, .were in the hands 
of the plaintiff prior to signing of the contract for $82,000 
on January 29, 195l, such that plaintiff on the signing of 
the contract agreed to the specifications for construction 
as above quoted. 
The plot plan has been discussed numerous times 
by appellant. Subsequent to January 29, 1951, the date 
of the signing of the contract, a plot plan was evolved 
and given to the plaintiff, so that there was a plot plan 
on the project, prior to the necessity for use of the same. 
Reference is here made to Article 3 of Exhibit P -3, 
which is the general conditions of the contract which 
is as follows : 
''Art. 3. Detail Drawings and Instructions.-
The Architect shall furnish with reasonable 
promptness, additional instructions by means of 
drawings or otherwise, necessary for the proper 
execution of the work. All such drawings and 
instructions shall be consistent with the Contract 
Documents, true developments thereof, and reas-
onably inferable therefrom.'' 
It should be supposed that all drawings for the 
construction of the eleven unit building were not com-
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plete in every detail, as to those instances at the latter 
part of the construction, such as connecting sewer and 
water systems, but the plot plan was furnished, the 
speeifications provided for the water and sewer systems 
1 o In• cormeded and tl1e architect ,Johnson testified that 
it wa~ anticipated that there would be a complete system 
of waste and vent piping and connected to the sewer 
system of Salt Lake City (R. 357) and that there would 
be a water system connecting the 11 unit apartment to 
the ~alt Lake City water system. (R. 358). 
Appellant numerous times during the brief has re-
ferred to the bid obtained by the architect (Ex. P-4) and 
(Ex. 17), an estimate sheet attached to a statement dated 
December 14, 1950 of the architect. Counsel for appellant 
seems to utterly disregard that portion of Exhibit P-4, 
l"Xcept the last yellow sheet which bears date of January 
8, 1951. Attention is called to page 4 of Exhibitlt4, in 
which it is recited in the bid of Grant Barnes on the 
plumbing the following: 
·'Sewer - approx. $2.20 per foot -
Estimate 150 ····--····-------···············--·--·$330.00 
Water service 35c per foot-
Estimate 100 --···········-···········-····--·-··-- 35.00'' 
These two items are included within the original bid 
of Grant Barnes and total $5,666.53. Counsel for ap-
pellant completely disregarded the itemized bid which 
includes the estimate for water and sewer service, and 
takes a subsequent bid, dated January 8, 1951 and relies 
upon the same. 
6 
J 
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It would seem to counsel for the defendants Parry, 
that plaintiff having had great experience in general 
contracting, which he has, that he would have noticed 
some discrepency between the two bids, of Exhibit P-4, 
and Exhibit 17, and which bids defendants Parry never 
did see until in another law suit in December of 1951. 
It might be that Page 4 of Exhibit P-4 has never been 
seen by counsel for appellant or has been entirely dis-
regarded in his argument. 
At page 8 of the appellant's brief, he states: 
''The opinion likewise does not mention the 
fact that defendant Parry had in his possession 
Exhibit D-27 dated December 14, 1950, which 
stated as the cost of the plumbing the exact 
amount of Exhibit P-4 which specifically declared 
that sewer and water were not included." 
Exhibit D-27 is the D. A. Olsen Company's instal-
lation order signed by Vern Millard, dated April15, 1951, 
and was never seen by defendants Parry until March 
of 1933, during a trial when he obtained this exhibit fron1 
Mr. Olsen for the purpose of having the exact amount 
of the heating contract determined. As before stated, 
Exhibit P-4 included the page 4 ·which counsel for plain-
tiff disregards, was never in the possession of defendants 
Parry until it was taken from Case #94041 for the pur-
pose of this trial, and therefore was handled between 
the architect and the plaintiff. 
Exhibit D-27 says nothing at all about plumbing, but 
has reference to installation of the heating system. 
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Counsel for appellant makes the further statement 
on page 8 of his brief: 
"When the heating was decided upon after 
the contract documents were signed, the heating 
costs were in excess of the allowance which the 
architect instructed :Mr. Millard to provide in his 
bid.'' 
Exhibit 27 discloses that the heating contract was 
<.·utered into by the plaintiff with D. A. Olsen Company 
for the sum of $7,875.00, yet the estimate of the architect, 
whieh is on the last page of B-17 indicates that the heat-
ing and hot water system, based on architect's estimate 
was the sum of $8,100.00, so that in effect the contract 
was let for $225 less than the architect's estimate. 
On page 9 of appellant's brief, he states: 
''When defendant Parry constructed the sewer, 
he did not use soil pipe, which is the least expen-
sive type of construction, but he used cast iron 
which cost several times more, and instead of 
laying the line directly to the street as shown on 
the master plan, he ran it diagonally and much 
deeper which made the line considerably longer 
and more costly.'' 
Counsel for defendants Parry would refer counsel 
for appellant to Exhibit 42, which is a statement and 
rancelled check attached, to George Chase in the sum 
of $426.82 covering payment for the pipe used by the 
defendants Parry at his own cost of installing the sewer 
and on which he was given credit during trial as being 
an item within the contract terms to be done on the part 
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of the plaintiff. The third from the last item on Exhibit 
42 shows that there was 220 feet of 4" soil pipe used, 
which cost $220.00, so that the defendants did use soil 
pipe in this construction. 
Counsel for appellant further, at the bottom of 
page 9, states: 
''The reason the Court did not find anything 
to disturb the findings is possibly because the 
Court overlooked the fact that the trial court 
based its allowance not on cost-plus 10% but on 
a theory of ''reasonable value,'' which amounted 
to only a small fraction of actual costs incurred 
by plaintiff.'' 
If counsel for appellant would take the time to 
examine page 72 of the record, he would discover that 
there is an itemized list covering the entire page of 
where the court granted to the plaintiff 10% overhead 
plus 10% contractor's fee, which totaled the sum of 
$7,230.34, for extras. 
On page 73 of the record, is further itemized those 
items upon which the contractor was allowed 10%, where 
the work was done by a subcontractor. The plaintiff in 
this instance received his 10% over the subcontractor's 
costs, thus the trial court never did determine the extras 
upon a "REASONABLE COST BASIS" but on those 
items performed by the plaintiff himself of extra costs, 
the trial court included 10% overhead and then a 10% 
contractor's fee to make the total for each item of extra. 
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Point 2. THE COUR'r HAS IN EFE,ECT DENIED 
THE PLAINTIFF HIS CONSTErUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF APPEAL BY PREDICATING ITS DECISION ON 
A srrA'rE OF FACTS MATERIALLY AT VARIANCE 
WITH THE RECORD MADE IN THE DISTRICT 
COUB/r. 
Ou this matter, it seems to counsel for respondents 
that counsel for appellant is implying that the decision 
is based on facts not in the record, which has been dis-
puted to the best ability of the writer of this brief. 
Point 3. THE OPINION DISREGARDS ONE OF THE 
FLAGRANrr ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY 
IGNORING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RE-
COVERY FOR CHANGES ON THE BASIS OF COST 
PLUS 10% AS AGREED UPO~, AND THE MUCH 
LOWER BASIS OF "REASONABLE VALUE" 
ADOPTED BY THE LOWER COURT. 
The statement of counsel for appellant under this 
point relates chiefly to the last portion set forth in 
detail under Point 1, under a theory of "REASONABLE 
ALLOWANCE'' against cost-plus 10% for extras. Again 
pages 72 and 73 of the record, which are findings of the 
trial court,· specifically itemize each item allowed by the 
court as being extras on this construction job. 
Counsel for appellant at page 11 of his brief states. 
"In effect, the trial court said Mr. Millard 
was entitled to his actual costs plus 10% as even 
the defendants testified that such was the agree-
10 
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ment, but in contradiction of such decision, the 
court deprived .Mr. :Millard of thousands of dol-
lars of his actual costs by allowing him only a 
small fraction thereof.'' 
As this court has said in its opinion, the trial court 
meticulously examined each item of extras from 1 
through 60 and in several instances determined that the 
items charged as extras were included within the ori-
ginal contract, and therefore were not chargeable as 
extra items. 
Point 4. rrHE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
At page 12 of appellant's brief, he states: 
''It makes no difference whether the agent was 
specifically directed by the owners to make the 
particular statements he made. The fact is that 
he wae engaged to line up materials (which is 
one of the functions of the general contractor). 
It might be well to reflect on how it happened that 
the architect in this instance was hired. The architect 
and the plaintiff were at the site one morning when 
defendant Parry appeared and it was through the con-
tractor and his recommendations that the architect be-
came employed. 
It must be admitted that the contractor did addi-
tional work upon adjacent property of the defendants 
Parry, as well as certain changes on this particular job, 
namely installation of garbage disposals, sliding doors 
on the bedroom closets, paving of the driveway and park-
11 
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ing area, changing of the type of glass in the louvers of 
some of the rooms in three apartments, all such items 
which were requested by the defendants were paid for 
by the defendants without any question. 
At page 14 of appellant's brief, he again refers to a 
substitute of "REASONABLE ALLOWANCE" theory 
instead of full recovery on the basis of contractor's 
cost-plus 10%. This matter has been covered before. 
Appellant's counsel further in the second paragraph 
of page 14 says : 
''It cost a lot of money to correct the mistakes 
in the architect's plans.'' 
The defendants Parry are well aware of that fact, 
having been allowed by the court the larger item in 
dispute which was the fact that the floor joists in the 
east end of the apartment ran in the wrong direction 
such that the air conduits could not be concealed in the 
ceiling which required the furring down of those walls 
and which cost based upon the testimony of plaintiff's 
superintendent on the job was allowed by the court. 
On page 15 of appellant's brief he refers to an ex-
hibit in case No. 94041 as to the statement of defendants 
Parry to the fact that they had employed under an oral 
contract the architect for architectural and supervisory 
services, covering the erection of an 11 unit apartment 
at the rear of 160 South 13th East Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. There has never been any question but that 
Defendant Parry hired the architect about December 
14, 1950. 
12 
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Point 5. THE DECISION MISCONSTRUES THE 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES, AND EXCEEDS 
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT BY REACH-
ING OUT TO COVER A PORTION OF THE JUDG-
MENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL WAS TAKEN. 
In answer to the question of the matter of the 
stipulation of payment of subcontractors, we again set 
forth paragraph 5 of the stipulation: 
'' 5. That as to the particular portions of said 
elaims so paid with respect to which it shall 
finally be adjudged that plaintiff is 11able, said 
defendants Jesse H. Parry and wife shall be 
entitled to credit in the above entitled cause as of 
the date payment of claims is made (which credit 
shall be in addition to the payment heretofore 
made to plaintiff and/or to materialmen or sub-
contractors).'' 
The last paragraph of appellant's brief at point 5 
states: 
''The Parrys willfully delayed payment for 
two years and caused the running up of interest 
and costs, and the Court unjustly makes the plain-
tiff liable for the defaults of the Parrys.'' 
The best answer which the writer of this brief has 
to this statement is Article 32 of the General Conditions 
of the contract as follows: 
"Art. 32. Liens.-Neither the final payment nor 
any part of the retained percentage shall become 
due until the Contractor, if required, shall deliver 
to the Owner a complete release of all liens aris-
ing out of this Contract, or receipts in full in lieu 
thereof and, if required in either case, an affidavit 
13 
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that so far as he has knowledge or information 
the releases and receipts include all the labor and 
material for which a lien could be filed." 
Point 6. 'l1HE DENIAL 0:£1, INTER:BJST ON SUMS 
DUE AND OWING TO PLAINTIFF IS CONTRARY 
'.rO LAW, AND AMOUNTS TO MAKING A CON-
TRACT FOR THE PARTIES WITHOUT ANY 
MEETING OF MINDS. 
At page 16 of appellant's brief 111 the first para-
graph, he states: 
''The opinion states that the plaintiff billed 
defendants on the wrong basis, and that there-
fore interest did not accrue.'' 
This court made no such statement in its opinion, 
but on page 2, first paragraph it made the following 
statement: 
''That billing however was for a balance 
claimed by plaintiff to be owing upon the whole 
construction upon a cost-plus basis. The court 
found, and we think correctly, that there was no 
contract for construction of the building on the 
cost-plus basis. That billing therefore cannot be 
considered a billing for the extras referred to.'' 
The opinion therefore does not state that it was on 
the wrong basis, but merely states it was not billed under 
the contract of January 29, 1951 for extras. 
Counsel further on page 17 states: 
''The contract documents required in full 
V\Tithin 30 days after completion of construction. 
Completion was bound to cover extras and 
changes. Defendants ordered most of the changes 
and knew about them." 
14 
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The answer to that question has before been set 
forth by Article 32, that the balance on the contract is 
not due until such time as there has been delivery by 
the contractor, of evidence of payment of bills to 
materialmen and subcontractors, which was not the case 
even at the date of trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been the endeavor of the writer within this 
brief to point out that the opinion as originally rendered 
by this court has completely covered all points raised 
by appellant on his appeal. 
Both during the trial of this matter, which was long 
and tedious, there was much time devoted to extras 
alleged on the part of appellant, and the opinion of this 
court has in detail covered each point raised by appel-
lant sufficiently and based upon ample record, such that 
consideration of this court, based upon petition for re-
hearing should not change the results. 
WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that 
the petition for rehearing be denied and that remittitur 
in this matter issue. 
Respectfully submitted 
W. D. BEATIE 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents Parry 
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